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1 Introduction
Agent-based Computational Economics (ACE) is a powerful framework
for studying emergent complex systems resulting from the interactions
of agents either mildly rational, or with incomplete information [1, 2, 3]
or driven by the social network [4, 5, 6].
This paper focuses on the interrelationship between social networks
and economic activities. Compared to the state of the art, the main
originality is that the social network dynamically evolves based on
the rational decisions of agents: a loan granting activity is enabled
by the network and the agents continuously re-shape the network to
optimize their utility. Three classes of agents (rational agents, free rid-
ers and “investors”) are considered. The global welfare is investigated
in relation with the agent diversity, examining the differential advan-
tages/disadvantages of the agent classes depending on their distribution
in the agent population. Lastly, the stability of e.g. the average interest
rate is contrasted with the unstability of the network structure.
After describing the state of the art and the problem tackled in
this paper (section 2), we present a loan granting game played by a
society of rational agents with a long-term utility function, conditioned
by and shaping their social network (section 3). Section 4 reports on the
simulation results; the main contributions of the approach are discussed
together with perspectives for further studies in section 5.
2 State of the Art and Goal of the Study
Introduced by Epstein and Axtell [7], Agent-based Computational Eco-
nomics established two major results (the interested reader is referred
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to [2, 3] for a comprehensive presentation). Firstly, the lack of a central-
ized walrasian auctioneer does not prevent a society of 0th-intelligence
agents from converging towards an economical equilibrium when agents
interact and exchange in a decentralized manner; secondly, this result
does not hold any longer if the agents can die or evolve.
Meanwhile, after the pioneering Milgram experiment [8] and many
further studies (e.g., [9]), the structure of social networks is acknowl-
edged a major factor of economics efficiency. A framework for analyzing
social network economics was defined [10], and exploited through either
analytical approaches, or various simulation-based extensions [4, 5, 6].
While both domains of ACE and social networks are clearly related,
to our best knowledge little attention has been devoted to the interde-
pendent evolution of social and economical activities, considering the
social network as both a result and an enabling support of the eco-
nomical activity. In such a unified perspective, the stress is put on the
complex system emerging through the interaction of social and eco-
nomical activities. Along this line, this paper investigates the complex
system made of a population of agents engaged in a loan granting activ-
ity, where the activity is simultaneously conditioned by, and shaping,
the social network. Basically, every agent is endowed with an indi-
vidual utility function parameterized after its fixed preference toward
immediate rewards; it accordingly decides between borrowing or lend-
ing money from/to its neighbors at every time step. While the network
thus governs the instant rational optimization problem faced by the
agents, agents can decide to create/delete links and thereby modify
the network. This setting contrasts with former studies [10, 4, 5, 6]
modelling the social network as the end of the socio-economic game,
that is, where the network only supports the exchange of information
and agents are assessed based on their position in the network.
Furthermore, agents will not reveal their preference − as opposed
to e.g. [7] where the exchange price is based on the preferences of both
agents. The fact that agents do not reveal their preference is relevant
to the study of socio-economic games in two respects; firstly it is more
realistic from a non-cooperative game perspective; secondly, the incom-
pleteness of information might adversely affect the convergence of the
game. Finally, the study examines the impact of the agent models and
strategies on the global welfare in a long term perspective. This con-
trasts with e.g. [10] focussing on the immediate network efficiency, and
discarding the long term impact of current decisions.
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3 Overview
This section presents the agent model, the interaction setting and the
observed variables of the system. Due to space limitations, the reader
is referred to [11] for details.
3.1 Agent model
The agent utility function models the intertemporal choice of the con-
sumer after the standard economic theory [12]. Formally, agent Ai max-
imizes the sum over all time steps of its weighted instant utilities. The
utility weight at time t, set to pti (0 < pi < 1), reflects the agent pref-
erence toward the present (parameter pi). The instant utility reflects
the current consumption level Ci,t, with a diminishing marginal util-
ity modeled through parameter bi (0 < bi < 1), standing for the fact
that the agent satisfaction is sublinear with its consumption level [13].
Letting Mi denote the lifelength of agent Ai, it comes:
Ui =
Mi
∑
t=0
(ptiC
bi
i,t) (1)
The instant neighborhood of agent Ai, noted Vi,t involves all agents Aj
such that link (i, j) belongs to the social network at time t. Additional
agent parameters comprise:
• Salary Ri: Ai receives a fixed salary Ri at the beginning of each
time step, and uses it to grant or pay back loans, to buy links, or
for consumption.
• Sociability factor si (0 < si < 1): Ai creates a new link (i, j)
(where j is uniformly chosen) with a probability si at each time
step; in case Ai is isolated, a new link is automatically created.
• Strategy Si: The social network comes at a cost, i.e. every link
(i, j) must be paid by agents Ai or Aj or both. Three social strate-
gies (classes of agents) are defined:
Optimizers accept to pay for a link iff it was profitable during the
last five time steps (if the utility increase due to this link offsets the
link cost). This strategy, referred to as rational strategy, deletes all
links which are not sufficiently useful.
Free Riders never pay for a link. While the free rider minimizes
its social cost (the link cost), it does not optimize its neighborhood
which might adversely affect its utility (see below).
Investors always accept to pay for a link. On the one hand this
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strategy gives the agent every means to optimize its economic activ-
ities, and possibly maintain beneficial relations with isolated agents;
on the other hand, it suffers the cost of possibly many useless links.
Under mild assumptions [11], agent Ai can compute its threshold
interest rate ri (lower bound for grant activities and upper bound for
loan activities). Note that this rate needs be updated after every ele-
mentary transaction as it depends on the agent current and expected
capital.
3.2 Interaction protocol
Every agent lives a sequence of epochs, where each epoch involves four
phases: i) salary and loans payback, ii) negotiation, iii) consumption,
iv) social activity (link creation/deletion).
During the first phase, agent Ai receives its salary Ri, reimburses
the money borrowed (plus interests) and is reimbursed for the money
lended (plus interests). The negotiation phase involes a variable number
of transactions. At each step, Ai determines the best possible borrow-
ing and lending rate; it maintains its estimation ri,j of the interest rate
for a transaction (borrow or grant) with every agent Aj in its neigh-
borhood, and proposes the best possible transaction for one currency
unit. Depending on whether the transaction is accepted, ri,j is updated
(Alg. 1). Agent Aj accepts a borrow transaction if the proposed rate is
lower than i) its limit rate rj and ii) its last borrow rates during this
negotiation phase (similar conditions hold for lend transactions).
The transactions proceed until no more transactions are realized.
BestRate r∗=0;
foreach Aj ∈ Vi such that rij > ri do
Propose Loan(rate=rij);
if accepted then
if rij > r
∗ then r∗ = rij ;
Increase(rij)
else
Decrease(rij)
end
end
if r∗ > 0 then Lend one currency unit at rate r∗
Algorithm 1: Lending transactions (borrowing transactions pro-
ceed likewise)
During the consumption phase, the agent computes its optimal frac-
tion of consumption (see [11]) and scores the corresponding utility.
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During the social phase, each agent decides whether it maintains its
links depending on its strategy and whether the link has been profitable
in the last five epochs. Link (i, j) is either maintained by agents Ai
and/or Aj , or deleted. Independently, Ai creates a new link (i, j) with
probability si (its sociability factor), where j is uniformly randomly
selected. If Ai has no neighbor, a link (i, j) is automatically created.
After Mi epochs, agent Ai dies. It is then replaced by a new agent
(reinitializing all agent parameters) with same neighborhood.
3.3 Fitness and Global Welfare
The socio-economical system will be assessed from the global welfare
of the agents. As the agent utilities cannot be directly compared (pa-
rameters pi and bi depend on the agent), they are normalized w.r.t. the
canonical consumer-only alternative strategy. Each Ai, would it have
adopted the consumer-only strategy, would get utility The consumer-
only agent, spending its whole salary in each time step, gets utility:
U∗i =
Mi
∑
t=0
(ptiR
bi
i ) = R
bi
i
1 − pMi+1i
1 − pi
Accordingly, the normalized fitness of Ai is defined as:
Fi =
(
Ui
U∗i
)
1
bi
− 1
Note that if Ai had spent a fixed fraction α, 0 ≤ α ≤ 1 of its salary in
each time step (without engaging in any borrowing or lending trans-
actions), it would score a normalized fitness α − 1. In brief, agent Ai
benefits from the social network iff its fitness Fi is positive.
The efficiency of the socio-economical system is thus measured from
the average normalized fitness of the individuals, and its standard de-
viation. Further, each class (optimizers, free-riders and investors) will
also be assessed from the average normalized fitness of the individuals
belonging to this class.
4 Results
After the description of the experimental setting, this section reports on
the impact of the network and agent dynamics on the global efficiency
of the system.
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4.1 Experimental settings
The socio-economical game is implemented and simulated within the
Moduleco framework [14]. The initial structure of the social network is
a ring, where each agent is connected to its two neighbors. Agents are
initialized by independently drawing their parameters using Gaussian
or uniform laws as follows.
• Time preference pi ∼ N (0.8, 0.075)
• Utility factor bi ∼ N (0.5, 0.1),
• Sociability factor si ∼ N (0.05, 0.05),
• Salary Ri ∼ N (20, 5),
• Life expectancy Mi ∼ U(20, 100),
The link cost is set to .2 in the remainder of the paper. Comple-
mentary experiments with varying values of the link cost are reported
in [11]. Experiments were conducted with a population size ranging
from 25 to 100, with similar results. All reported results are averaged
over 25 independent experiments conducted with 25 agents over 1000
epochs. The global (respectively, class) fitness is computed by averag-
ing the normalized fitness of agents (resp. belonging to the class) that
died before the 1000th. epoch.
4.2 Complete and costless information
The classical economic theory relies on the assumption of a complete
and costless information, e.g. gathered and disseminated by the “wal-
rasian auctioneer”, enforcing the convergence of the interest rate toward
the equilibrium rate. As formally shown in [11], the equilibrium rate
can be analytically derived from the agent utility functions.
The first experiment, as a sanity check, thus considers the fully con-
nected social network and compares the empirical interest rate toward
the equilibrium rate. As expected, the average interest rate rapidly
converges toward the equilibrium value τ (τ = .24 in the experimental
setting, Fig. 1). The standard deviation (< .0025 after 5 epochs in the
fully connected case) is explained from the experimental noise, discrete
loan amount and limited number of agents.
Interestingly, randomly removing edges in the social network only
delays the convergence toward the equilibrium rate, although the stan-
dard deviation of the interest rate significantly increases for social net-
works with low density. Fig. 1 displays the standard deviation vs the
percentage of edges in the social network after 20 epochs.
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Fig. 1. Interest rate and standard de-
viation within a complete network
Fig. 2. Impact of the network connec-
tivity on the standard deviation of in-
terest rate after 20 epochs
4.3 Rational and Immortal Agents
The second experiment focuses on rational agents (optimizer strategy)
with infinite lifelength. Despite the fact that the social network can
evolve with the rational agent decisions, the empirical interest rate still
converges toward the equilibrium rate. Still, the convergence is slower
than in the previous case, and the standard deviation remains high
after 1000 epochs (Fig. 3).
Fig. 3. Rational and Immortal Agents: Standard Deviation of the Interest
Rate
Most surprisingly, while the interest rate reaches the equilibrium,
it does so with a continuously changing social network; no edge in the
network appears to last more than a few epochs, as agents endlessly
optimize their neighborhood. Indeed, in either competitive or monop-
olistic situations, there always exists some profitable link creation or
deletion. The canonical case of a 3-agent network, depicted in Fig. 4,
involves three possible configurations (being reminded that a link is
created automatically when an agent is isolated), all of which are un-
stable. In the n-agent case, instability is increased by cascading effects,
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the creation/deletion of a link leading to further link deletions or cre-
ations.
Fig. 4. 3-agent network configurations; arrows indicate the lender-borrower
pair
1 In the triangle (clique) case, there are two possible situations:
– If A can lend the desired amount to C with a rate higher than
the B limit rate rb, A is not interested in maintaining link AB,
which will thus be deleted.
– If the C limit rate rc decreases (because of the loans contracted
by C) and becomes lower than rb, A will grant loans to B and C
(with a rate lower than rb). Therefore B will be unable to lend
money to C, since C will refuse to borrow money with rate higher
than rb. Thus the BC link becomes useless and will be deleted.
2 In the line case, B borrows from A at rate τAB < rB. C borrows
from B at rate τBC > rB. When A or C will create the link AC, it
will be stable because A will accept to grant loans to C at a rate
τBC − ǫ which will be higher (and thus more profitable) than τAB.
We are back to case 1.
3 In the star case (case 3a), agent A is the only one lending money.
In this monopolistic situation, A will progressively increase the loan
granting rate, until the BC link becomes profitable and thus stable
when it will be created. We are back to case 1. Same analysis holds
for case 3b (C will decrease its borrow rate).
4.4 Mixed Populations and Global Welfare
Let us consider the mixed population cases. Each possible distribution
of the strategies (or classes) in the population is represented as a point
in the 2D plane, where the x (resp. y) coordinate stands for the propor-
tion of Free Riders (resp. Investors) in the population (Fig. 5). Point
(x, y) is associated with the global population welfare or fitness. Con-
sidering the three pure strategies (optimizers only, (0,0); investors only
(0,1); free-riders only (1,0)), the Optimizer strategy is by far the best
one; this fact is explained as the free-rider-only population generates a
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sparse random network, while the investor-only population generates a
clique (and pays the price for it).
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Fig. 5. Average Fitness vs Strategy Distribution in the Population. Point
(x, y) correspond to the distribution of x% free-riders, y% investors and 1 −
x − y % optimizers. Each fitness level differs by .5 from the neighbor fitness
levels.
Most interestingly, in the case of mortal agents, mixed populations
outperform optimizer-only populations; e.g. the uniform distribution
(1/3 optimizers, 1/3 free-riders and 1/3 investors) gets an average fit-
ness significantly higher than the optimizer-only population (comple-
mentary experiments show that this result also holds when the link cost
is significantly higher or lower, see [11]). This fact is explained as the
useless links paid for by investors, are actually very useful to quickly
reorganize the network when an agent dies.
4.5 Class Behaviors
While agent diversity is beneficial on average, it remains to examine
whether “class behaviors” appear in the population. Two issues will
be specifically investigated. Firstly, do the average class fitness depend
on its representativity, ie, its percentage of the population (intra-class
effects); secondly, do the class representativity affect the average fitness
of the other classes (inter-class effects).
The free-rider class does present a class behavior (Fig. 6): their fit-
ness is excellent when they are a minority, and it decreases rapidly as
the free-rider representativity increases. The investor class also displays
10 Philippe Caillou, Frederic Dubut and Michele Sebag
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
Free Riders
In
ve
st
or
s
Optimizer Fitness c=.2
Optimizers
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
Free Riders
In
ve
st
or
s
Free Rider Fitness c=.2
Free riders
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
Free Riders
In
ve
st
or
s
Investor Fitness c=.2
−5
0
5
10
Investors
Fig. 6. Strategy average fitness; each level represents an increase/decrease of
1 for the strategy average fitness
a class behavior: their fitness is good when the representativity of opti-
mizers is sufficiently high, as the optimizers share the costs of the links.
In summary, the average fitness of investors and free-riders depends on
the class distribution; quite the opposite, the optimizer fitness does not.
We finally examine the impact on the global and class welfares, of
the arrival of a new agent depending on its class (Fig. 7).
0
0.5
1
0
0.5
1
−4
−2
0
2
4
Free Riders
Optimizer Impact
Investors
−5
0
5
Optimizers
0
0.5
1
0
0.5
1
−4
−2
0
2
4
Free Riders
Free Rider Impact
Investors
−5
0
5
Free riders
0
0.5
1
0
0.5
1
−2
0
2
4
6
8
Free Riders
Investor Impact
Investors
−5
0
5
Investors
Fig. 7. Adding a new agent: impacts on the fitness of the other classes
The arrival of an investor is globally beneficial to other classes. and
even more so when there a few optimizers. Indeed, investors fund the
infrastructure used by the other agents; their impact is greater when
the network is poor (when there are few optimizers).
The arrival of a free rider has a negative impact on the rest of the
economy, except when there are many investors. In this case, the free
rider decreases the graph connectivity level (and cost) and allows a
faster reorganization of the network.
Optimizers, which are not influenced by economic class structure,
do not influence it either. Their impact is mostly neutral, though it
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might be positive in the extreme cases where there are no investors or
no free riders.
5 Conclusion and Perspectives
The socio-economic game presented in this paper, based on autonomous
and diversified agents, leads to two lessons. The first one concerns the
fact that the convergence of economic macro-variables such as the in-
terest rate is compatible with the unstability of the social network sup-
porting the economic activities. Secondly, the benefits of the population
diversity have been empirically demonstrated and interpreted in terms
of the emerging class behaviors. While investors and free-riders display
class behaviors (their fitness depends on the population structure, they
have an impact on the welfare of the other classes), the optimizer class
seems to be almost unaffected by the population structure, and exerts
little influence in return.
Further research perspectives are concerned with the dynamics of
the class structure, examining how the best fit agents can influence the
distribution, preferences and strategies of the new-born agents.
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